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NOTES AND COMMENTS
procedure presents the dilemma of whether to preserve the basic con-
cepts of law through orderly process, on the one hand, or to act
decisively while it is still possible, on the other. Some procedure
must be preserved, and perhaps the best way to do that is through
the judge's own thought processes. In a recent federal decision6 2
concerning failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor, a judge
was reversed not because he had failed to appoint a guardian, but
because he had failed to give the matter careful consideration, so that
his decision was based on inadvertence. Not the decision itself, but
the mode of arriving at it seemed significant to the court. Perhaps
Judge Wright was on the right track when he gave the interested
parties actual notice of his intention to act and when he advised
the patient's husband to obtain counsel. Perhaps he should have
gone further in actually explaining to the parties the legal sig-
nificance of what he might do and their rights with respect to it.
Of course, there is great virtue in the mechanics of service of
process and filing of pleadings, for such devices nurture the Ameri-
can ideal-law over man. But, in an emergency situation, perhaps the
best that can be done is to require the judge to adhere to the rules of
procedure as closely as possible, yet allow discretion to temper them.
DORis R. BRAY
Taxation-Estate Planningm-The Marital Deduction-Formula Be-
quests
The marital deduction was first introduced into the federal
estate tax law in 19481 to eliminate the inequities2 between tax
treatment of estates in common law states and those in community
property states. It allows a deduction of up to fifty per cent of the
adjusted gross estates for the value of any property interest, other
"2 Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958).
"Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 361, 62 Stat. 117, amending Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 812, 53 Stat. 123 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056).
For a discussion of the history of the marital deduction see, United States
v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963).
2 LOWNDES & KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxEs 368-70 (2d ed.
1962).
SINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(c) (1). The adjusted gross estate is
derived by subtracting from the gross estate expenses and deductions allowed
under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2053, 2054. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2056(c) (2) (A). It is a concept primarily designed for determining the
marital deduction. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 5 (1948).
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than community property, passing from the decedent to the sur-
viving spouse.4 Generally, property included in the decedent's
gross estate5 which passes to the surviving spouse in such a way as
to be taxed in her estate, assuming she still owns it at the time of
her death,' is eligible for the marital deduction. For many it is the
most important deduction in federal estate tax law.7
Since its enactment seventeen years ago, various methods have
evolved to express the size of the marital deduction. Among these
are nonformula s and formula9 bequests. The two most widely used
formulas are the fractional share0 formula and the pecuniary in-
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a).
5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a).
' GRIswOLD, FEDERAL TAxATION 942 (5th ed. 1960).
7 ESTATE PLANNERS QuARTaRLY 272 (Huber ed. 1962); Sargent, A.B.C.
and D. of Marital Deductions, 7 TAX Couxs -oa's Q. 178, 180-81 (1963).
See 2 FED. EST. & GIFT TAX REP. 7155 for a demonstration as to how much
it is possible to save in the first estate through use of the marital deduction
in estates of various sizes.
'The nonformula bequest is represented by a sum certain gift where
testator leaves "the sum of one hundred thousand dollars" to my beloved wife,
Jane, or by a fractional gift where testator leaves, "one-half of my residuary
estate" to my beloved wife, Jane. 1 CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 792, 794
(3d ed. 1961). These two methods are employed when testator desires to
leave a definite amount, specific property, or a certain percentage of his estate
to his surviving spouse without being concerned with obtaining the exact
amount of the maximum allowable deduction.
'The formula marital bequest arose when lawyers were faced with a
client who wanted his wife to receive the exact amount of the maximum
marital deduction and not a cent more; a formula seemed to be the only
solution. Stevens, Fourteen Years of Marital Deduction, N.Y.U. 21ST INST.
ON FED. TAX 257, 271 (1963). A formula clause by definition seeks to de-
fine the property passing to the surviving spouse in terms such that regardless
of the size and nature of the decedent's estate, the surviving spouse will re-
ceive, from all sources combined, just sufficient property to fully utilize the
marital deduction. A formula clause serves no purpose if decedent desires
to leave his spouse more or less than the maximum marital deduction. Burch,
Use and Misuse of the Marital Deduction, U. So. CAL. 1963 TAX INST. 609,
641. The formula provisions apply equally to outright gifts or gifts left in
trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse.
" The fractional share formula creates a gift of the designated fractional
share of each item in the fund to which the described fraction is to be applied.
Casner, Marital Deduction Gifts, 99 TRUSTS & ESTATES 190 (1960). When
this formula appears in a will, the residuary estate normally will be the
fund against which the designated fraction is applied. 1 CASNER, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 798. Professor Casner suggests the following words to
create a fractional share formula:
If my said wife survives me, I give to ... the following described frac-
tional share of my residuary estate:
The numerator of the fraction shall be the maximum estate tax
marital deduction (allowable in determining the Federal estate tax payable
by reason of my death) minus the value for Federal estate tax purposes
[Vol. 43
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terest formula. The first of these to be developed was the pecuniary
interest formula which allocates an amount for the benefit of the
marital distributee equal to one-half of testator's adjusted gross
estate." The next step in the formula's development was to add a
clause to the governing instrument giving the executor power to
satisfy the bequest in kind so that the assets of the estate would not
have to be liquidated for distribution in cash.'2 However, when the
of all items in my gross estate which qualify for said deductions and
which pass or have passed in a form which qualifies for the estate tax
marital deduction from me to my said wife (the words 'pass or have
passed' shall have the same meaning as such words shall have under
the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time of my
death) under other provisions of this will, by right of survivorship with
respect to jointly owned property, under settlement arrangements re-
lating to life insurance proceeds, or otherwise than under this fractional
share gift of my residuary estate (in computing the numerator, the
values as finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes shall con-
trol); and the denominator of the fraction shall be the value of my
residuary estate (the value of my residuary estate shall be determined
on the basis of the values as finally determined for Federal estate tax
purposes).
CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 308 (Supp. 1964). To illustrate the fractional
share formula, assume an adjusted gross estate of $200,000 and those assets
composing the residuary estate as being valued at $170,000 as determined for
federal estate tax purposes. The numerator of Casner's formula is the
maximum estate tax marital deduction and is equal to $100,000. The de-
nominator of the fraction is the value of those assets composing the
residuary estate as determined for federal estate tax purposes. Here the
denominator is $170,000 and the fraction appears as $100,000/$170,000. In
determining the estate tax, when the fraction is applied to the assets com-
posing the residuary estate valued at federal estate tax values, the de-
nominator and the assets composing the residuary estate cancel out, leaving
a maximum marital deduction of $100,000; i.e., $100,000/$170,000 X $170,000
= $100,000. In making distribution, the above fraction is applied to the assets
composing the residuary estate valued at the date of distribution. Dane,
Marital Deduction Questions, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 112, 113 (1964). The
marital distributee will consequently share in appreciation and depreciation
of the estate under the fractional share formula. If the assets composing the
residuary estate have doubled in value by the time of distribution, the marital
distributee will receive 10/17 X $340,000 or $200,000. However, if they
have depreciated to half, the marital distributee will receive 10/17 X $85,000,
or $50,000. See Smith, Marital Deduction in Estate Planning, 32 TAXES 15(1954). In addition to allowing the marital distributee to share in the ap-
preciation of the estate, the fractional share formula creates no capital
gains problem for the estate because no right to any specific dollar amount
is being satisfied. Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 286; Casner, Frac-
tional Share Marital Gifts, Trust Bull., March 1960, pp. 42, 43. For a good
discussion of the fractional share clause see Durbin, Marital Deduction For-
inula Revisited, 102 TRUSTS & ESTATES 545 (1963).
"Lauritzen, The Marital Deduction, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 318 (1964).
In re Campbell's Will, 144 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Surr. Ct. 1955) ; In re Lazar's
Estate, 139 Misc. 261, 247 N.Y. Supp. 230 (Surr. Ct. 1930); 3 SCOT, TRUSTS
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executor was given this power, he was required by law to value the
property so distributed as of the date of distribution unless a con-
trary date was expressed in the instrument.'3 And, if an appreciated
asset were used to satisfy the pecuniary bequest in kind to the marital
distributee, the estate would realize a gain in the amount of the
difference between the basis of the appreciated asset and the amount
of the bequest so satisfied. 4 When a specific bequest is left to the
surviving spouse, the pecuniary interest formula is considered to
create a bequest to the marital distributee of a specific sum, the sum
becoming fixed in amount when the amount of the adjusted gross
estate is established. When the executor is allowed to substitute
assets in kind in satisfaction of this specific amount, he is con-
sidered to have made a "sale or exchange" of those assets. The
estate's basis is the fair market value at the requisite estate tax
valuation date. Accordingly, when these assets, valued as of date
of distribution, are "sold" in satisfaction of the specific pecuniary
amount, any excess of this fictional "selling price" over their basis
is treated as recognized gain. To avoid the realization of this gain,
the executor came to be instructed in the instrument to satisfy the
marital bequest with property valued at its date of death estate tax
value."5 The last step in development of the formula, along with the
elimination of gain, opened new doors for the executor to engage in
post mortem estate planning.16 This is best illustrated by way of
example.
Suppose testator's will contained the following pecuniary interest
formula bequest :'r
I give, devise, and bequeath to my wife... an amount equal to
fifty per cent of my adjusted gross estate as finally determined for
§ 347.6 (2d ed. 1956); Lloyd, Background of Drafting Problems, 103 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 898 (1964); Zimmerman, The Effect of In-Kind Settlements,
N.Y.U. 22d INsT. ON FED. TAX 1111 (1964).
1" Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Reed, 229 Mass. 267, 118 N.E. 333
(1918); In the Matter of Clark, 251 N.Y. 458, 167 N.E. 586 (1929).
", Commissioner v. Brinckerhoff, 168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948); Kenan
v. Commisioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4(a) (3) (1957) ; Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 CuM. BUL.. 286; Rev. Rul. 56-270,
1956-1 CuM. BULL. 325.
Bronston, State and Federal Taxation, 96 TRUSTS & ESTATES 887(1957).
1 Goldern, Rev. Proc. 64-19, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 536, 537 (1964).
" For a good discussion and several variations on the pecuniary interest
formula see Cox, Types of Marital Formula Clauses, N.Y.U. 15r INST. ON
FED. TAX 909, 926-30 (1957).
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federal estate tax purposes .... My executors shall have full au-
thority to satisfy this bequest, wholly or partly in cash or kind...
provided however, that any property so conveyed . . . shall be
valued for that purpose at the value thereof as finally determined
for federal estate tax purposes.
Assume that at date of death testator's adjusted gross estate is com-
posed of two blocks of corporate stock, Stock A and Stock B, each
valued as of that time at 200,000 dollars. Using date of death estate
tax values the formula would yield 200,000 dollars for the marital
distributee. However, by the time of distribution, some time after
date of death, Stock A had appreciated in value to 300,000 dollars
and Stock B had depreciated in value to 100,000 dollars. With dis-
cretionary power in the executor to satisfy the bequest in kind at
estate tax values, the executor would be able to transfer Stock B to
the marital distributee and Stock A to the residuary legatee.' Thus,
the decedent's estate obtains credit for the full value of the marital
deduction and would pay federal estate tax on 200,000 dollars. Upon
the subsequent death of the widow her gross estate would include
assets of 100,000 dollars, assuming that they had not been disposed
of during her lifetime and had not further changed in value. The
result is an aggregate taxable estate for husband and wife of 300,000
dollars, thereby allowing 100,000 dollars in value to escape inclusion
in either estate. It was practice of this nature which provoked the
Internal Revenue Service into issuing Revenue Procedure 64-19.1"
In Rev. Proc. 64-19, the Commissioner has asserted that he will
deny the entire marital deduction in the event of any pecuniary be-
quest or transfer to a surviving spouse unless, by applicable state
law20 or by the express or implied provisions of the instrument, it is
18 Smith, Marital Dediection. Values, 90 TRUSTS & ESTATES 16 (1951).
1" 1964 INT. REV. BULL. No. 15, at 30 [hereinafter cited as Rev. Proc.
64-19].
" The state courts have had a difficult time deciding whether the particular
language created a pecuniary interest or a fractional share formula and
whether the marital distributee would be allowed to share in the appreciation
or depreciation of the estate's assets. The greatest number of decisions come
from New York. In It re Bush's Will, 2 App. Div. 2d 526, 156 N.Y.S.2d
897 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 908, 145 N.E.2d 872, 167 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1957)
and In re Estate of Inman, 22 Misc. 2d 573, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (Surr. Ct.
1959), the court treated what would appear to be a pecuniary bequest as if it
were a fractional share of the residue and held the marital distributee to
share proportionally in the appreciation and depreciation of the estate's
assets. Accord, In re Estate of Nickelsburg, 34 Misc. 2d 82, 224 N.Y.S.2d
90 (Surr. Ct. 1961). In lit re Estate of Bing, 23 Misc. 2d 326, 200 N.Y.S.2d
913 (Surr. Ct. 1960), the marital deduction clause clearly indicated a frac-
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clear the fiduciary, in order to implement such bequest or transfer,
(1) must distribute assets, including cash, having an aggregate fair
market value at the date, or dates, of distribution amounting to
no less than the amount of the pecuniary bequest or transfer, as
finally determined for Federal estate tax purposes ....
or
(2) must distribute assets, including cash, fairly representative of
appreciation or depreciation in the value of all property thus
available for distribution in satisfaction of such pecuniary be-
quest or transfer .... 21
If the bequest meets either of these tests the marital deduction will
not be denied. However, even if it is not clear as to the discretion
of the fiduciary, the deduction may nevertheless be allowed in all in-
struments executed prior to October 1, 1964, if the fiduciary and the
surviving spouse file agreements" with the Internal Revenue Serv-
tional share formula, but there was no direction to the executor to evaluate
the marital bequest at federal estate tax values. The court held that the
marital distributee would share in the appreciation and depreciation of the
estate's assets. A similar result was reached in In re Ossman's Will, 27 Misc.
2d 632, 209 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Surr. Ct. 1960). In It re Gilmour's Estate, 18
App. Div. 2d 154, 238 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1963), the court found a pecuniary
formula gift, thereby prohibiting the spouse from sharing in the appreciation
of security values from the date of death to the date of distribution. In
In re Estate of Mueller, 34 Misc. 2d 584, 228 N.Y.S.2d 399 (Surr. Ct. 1962),
the court found a fractional formula and in It re Schimenti's Will, 249
N.Y.S.2d 641 (Surr. Ct. 1964), the court said that the results of New York
decisions "indicate a constructional preference for the percentage or frac-
tional type of 'marital deduction trust'." Id. at 644. Accord, In re Penny's
Will, 251 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Surr. Ct. 1964).
In Althouse Estate, 404 Pa. 412, 172 A.2d 146 (1961), the Pennsylvania
court had before it the question, "whether the testator made a gift in a
dollar amount in the nature of a pecuniary gift equal to the maximum marital
deduction, in which case it would not share in the increased value of the
assets of the estate during its administration, or whether he made a frac-
tional share gift, in which case it would share in such increased value." Id.
at 414, 146 A.2d at 147. The court construed the language "so much of my
estate . . . [which] shall equal the maximum marital deduction," to be a
pecuniary gift. Id. at 414-15, 146 A.2d at 147.
In In the Matter of the Estate of Nicolai, 232 Ore. 105, 373 P.2d 967
(1962), the Oregon court stated that "the draftsman of a will who desires to
provide for a maximum marital deduction must tread lightly on thin ice."
Id. at 112, 373 P.2d at 970. The court held that the given clause created a
fractional share rather than a general pecuniary legacy. Contra, Maguire v.
Stirling, 317 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1963); King v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank,
103 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1958) ; In the Matter of the Estate of Kantner, 52 N.J.
Super. 24, 144 A.2d 553 (1958).
" Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 2.02.
2 Sections 5.01 and 5.02 of Rev. Proc. 64-19 contain the applicable forms
to be executed by the fiduciary and the surviving spouse. As a practical
[Vol. 43
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ice to the effect that the division of assets so distributed between the
marital and the residuary distributees "will be fairly representative
of the net appreciation or depreciation in the value of the available
matter instruments created prior to October 1, 1964, should be revised. This
is true for several reasons: First, it has been held in North Carolina that a
codicil to a will amounts to a republication of that will with the result that
its date is that of the codicil. Hatch v. Hatch, 3 N.C. 32 (1798). Accord,
Young v. Williams, 253 N.C. 281, 116 S.E.2d 778 (1960); In the Matter of
the Will of Coffield, 216 N.C. 285, 4 S.E.2d 870 (1939); Battle v. Speight,
31 N.C. 288 (1848). See generally ATKInsoN, WILLs 427 (2d ed. 1953).
Thus if testator's will, published in 1954, comes within the prohibited lan-
guage of Rev. Proc. 64-19 and a codicil was executed in December 1964,
it would appear that the executor and the surviving spouse would be unable
to file the appropriate agreements. However, contrary results have been
suggested. Covey, The Marital Deduction: Revenue Procedure 64-19 and
Formula Provisions, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 317, 332 (1964). It has been suggested
that the agreements should be filed only when the testator is either dead or
incompetent and a new will cannot be executed. Colson, The Marital De-
duction & Revenue Procedure 64-19, Prac. Law., Oct. 1964, pp. 69, 78.
Second, there is the possibility that the spouse may be incompetent, or
refuse to sign, or die before having had a chance to sign. Third, there is
uncertainty under state law as to whether an executor would have the
authority to file such an agreement. Two pieces of legislation have been
proposed for North Carolina. Letter From F. Thomas Miller, Charlotte,
N. C., to Members of the Committee on Taxation of the North Carolina
Bar Association, Nov. 6, 1964. The purpose of the proposed legislation,
assuming that they are not proposed in the alternative, appears to be twofold.
First, to allow North Carolina executors to distribute assets to the marital
distributee fairly representative of the appreciation or depreciation in value
of all property available for distribution and thus comply with section 2.02 of
Rev. Proc. 64-19. Second, to allow the executor to file the agreement under
section 5.02 of Rev. Proc. 64-19 with the Internal Revenue Service. The
first proposed statute provides:
SECTION 1. That whenever under any Last Will and Testament or
Trust Indenture the Executor, Trustee or other fiduciary is required to,
or has an option to, satisfy a bequest or transfer in trust to or for the
benefit of the surviving spouse of a decedent by a transfer of assets of
the estate or trust in kind at the values as finally determined for Federal
estate tax purposes, the Executor, Trustee or other fiduciary shall, in
the absence of contrary provisions in such Will or Trust Indenture, be
required to satisfy such bequest or transfer by the distribution of assets
fairly representative of the appreciation or depreciation in the value of all
property available for distribution in satisfaction of such bequest or
transfer. (Emphasis added.)
It is suggested that the emphasized clause, "in the absence of contrary pro-
visions in such Will or Trust Indenture," prevents the proposed statute from
accomplishing its intended purpose. If the instrument does, as it well may,
contain contrary provisions, this statute will not save it from the grasp of
Rev. Proc. 64-19 and the marital deduction will be denied. The second pro-
posed statute provides:
SECTION 1. That the Executor, Trustee, or other fiduciary having
discretionary powers under a Last Will and Testament or Trust Indenture
with respect to the selection of assets to be distributed in satisfaction of a
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property on the date or dates of distribution. ' 23 If the fiduciary
fails to distribute according to the filed agreement, the surviving
spouse will be deemed to have made a gift to the beneficiary in whose
favor the failure occurs, unless upon first being apprised of the
situation, he or she seasonably objects. 24 For all instruments exe-
cuted on or after October 1, 1964, Rev. Proc. 64-19 states that the
marital deduction will be disallowed if the bequest does not meet
either of the tests noted in the immediately preceding paragraph.
In further explanation, section 4.01 of Rev. Proc. 64-19 sets
forth several situations involving bequests to which it does not apply.
The substance of these is:
(1) a bequest or transfer in trust of a fractional share formula where
each beneficiary shares proportionally in the appreciation or de-
preciation in the value of the assets to the date of distribution,
(2) bequest of specific assets, or
(3) a pecuniary bequest (in formula or stated amount)
where:
a) the bequest must be satisfied solely in cash, or
b) the fiduciary has no discretion in the selection of the assets
to be distributed in kind, or
bequest or transfer in trust to or for the benefit of the surviving spouse
of a decedent shall be authorized to enter into agreements with the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue of the United States of America, and
other taxing authorities, requiring the fiduciary to exercise the fiduciary's
discretion so that the assets of the estate, both cash and other property,
available for distribution will be distributed between (i) the marital de-
duction bequest or transfer in trust and (ii) the balance of the estate
available for distribution in satisfaction of such bequest or transfer in
trust so that cash and other properties distributed in satisfaction of the
marital deduction bequest or transfer in trust will be fairly representa-
tive of the net appreciation or depreciation in value of the available
property on the date, or dates, of distribution. It is the purpose of this
act to authorize such fiduciary to enter into any agreement that may be
necessary or advisable in order to secure for Federal estate tax purposes
the appropriate marital deduction available under the Internal Revenue
Laws of the United States of America and to do and perform all acts
incident to such purpose.
The first proposed statute (minus the questioned clause) and the second
proposed statute are almost identical to two recent Mississippi statutes.
2 P-H WILLS, EST., TRUSTS, Miss. 2665 (1964). The North Carolina
statutes appear to accomplish the desired results. If the first proposed statute
is amended as suggested, quaere whether the legislature can "authorize" the
executor to go against the express provisions of the will without raising a
constitutional question.
23 Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 3.01.
Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 3.02.
[Vol. 43
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c) assets to be distributed in kind are required to be valued at
their respective values on the date, or dates, of distribution.25
One author2 6 has suggested that as a matter of law the premise
of the Commissioner in Rev. Proc. 64-19 was erroneous because
fiduciaries are required to act fairly and exercise their powers in
accordance with the basic principles of equity. This is undoubtedly
true, and where the spouse has received depreciated property and
the other legatees appreciated property and she objects, there is
authority2 7 for requiring the executor to deal fairly in apportioning
the property. However, it is suggested that the Commissioner was
primarily concerned with situations where there has been collusion
between the executors and the surviving spouse, the latter having
agreed to accept the depreciated assets. In such an instance there is
no one with standing, and incentive,28 to sue to compel the executor
to deal equitably in apportioning the property.
The approach of the Commissioner in Rev. Proc. 64-19 was
foreshadowed in his actions in Estate of Daniel Walsh, 2  a case
recently pending before the Tax Court. In Walsh a pecuniary in-
terest formula3 0 was employed containing features which were later
to be held objectionable by Rev. Proc. 64-19. In computing the
taxable estate, the Commissioner limited the marital deduction to
Rev. Proc. 64-19, § 4.01.
28 Lauritzen, supra note 10, at 318; Lauritzen, The Treasury Department
and the Marital Deduction Formula-Teapot Tempest in Washington, 7 TAx
COUNCELOR'S Q. 251 (1963).
"Hall v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1945); Carrier v. Car-
rier, 226 N.Y. 114, 123 N.E. 135 (1919).
28 It would seem unlikely that the legatees who receive the appreciated
assets would object to the widow's receiving the depreciated ones.
"2 Estate of Daniel Walsh, Doc. No. 3433-63, pending T. C. (July 16,
1963), CCH TAx CT. REP. 1962-63 trans. binder 5650. See generally IRS
Mounts Attack on Formula Marital Deduction Bequests, 18 J. TAXATION
319 (1963); Trust Value Increase Added to Marital Deduction Trust, 13
J. TAxATION 382-83 (1960). As far back as 1951 Casner suggested that the
use of the legacy provision authorizing distribution in kind at estate tax
values may raise a problem with the marital deduction. Casner, Estate
Planning-Marital Deduction Provisions of Trust, 64 HARV. L. REv. 582,
593-96 (1951).
20 The formula in Walsh reads:
such portion of my estate as will, but no more than is necessary to, pro-
duce the full allowable deduction ....
My Executors shall have full authority and discretion to satisfy this
bequest, wholly or partly in cash or kind.., however... any property so
conveyed ... shall be valued for that purpose at the value thereof as finally
determined for Federal estate tax purposes ....
Quoted in CCH, MARITAL DEDUCTION RULE 9-10 (1964).
1965]
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the value of the non-probate assets passing to the surviving spouse
outside of the will. A marital deduction of 330,936.33 dollars was
denied with respect to the pecuniary bequest."'
It is suggested that the Commissioner's approach in Walsh and
in Rev. Proc. 64-19 of denying the entire marital deduction will
not be sustained by the courts, particularly where, although the
instrument contains those features held objectionable by Rev. Proc.
64-19, the executor has, in fact, exercised his discretion fairly and
equitably in apportioning the estate's assets. A more meaningful
and less doubtful solution would be for the Commissioner to limit
the deduction to the amount actually received by the marital dis-
tributee. The upper limit would still remain one-half of the ad-
justed gross estate while the lower limit would be the fair market
value as of date of distribution of the property actually passing
to the surviving spouse. Then, if there were to be collusion between
the executor and the surviving spouse for the latter to receive de-
preciated assets, the estate's marital deduction would be limited to
the value of those assets; and the estate, not being able to take
maximum advantage of the marital deduction, would suffer an un-
necessary tax burden. The possibility of losing part of the marital
deduction should act as a sufficient deterrent to prevent the collusive
practice of the executor and the surviving spouse. A denial of part
of the marital deduction will increase the size of the taxable estate
and correspondingly will increase the amount of the estate tax to be
paid. The estate tax is generally held to be payable out of assets other
than those comprising the marital share.82 The possibility of the
legatee's having to pay a higher estate tax should act as a sufficient
incentive to assure that all property is apportioned fairly and equi-
tably. It has also been suggested 33 that the deduction could be limited
to the value at the date of distribution of the maximum assets with
which the bequest could be satisfied on the theory that this is all
the surviving spouse received from the decedent, the excess being
given to her by the executors. It is felt, however, that the latter
would create an unnecessary fiction in the law.
In the light of Rev. Proc 64-19, providence suggests that, unless
3" Ibid.
2 For a discussion of the law concerning the apportionment of taxes in
the various states, see Durand, Marital Deduction Litigation, 101 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 8 (1962).
"' Burch, supra note 9, at 647-48.
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the estate planner is prepared to litigate with the Commissioner and
risk the loss of his client's marital deduction, a form of bequest
should be employed which is acceptable under section 4.01 of Rev.
Proc. 64-19. If the estate planner still prefers to use the pecuniary
interest formula, it should be amended to comply with section 2.02
of Rev. Proc. 64-19 by adding: (1) a clause requiring the executor,
when satisfying the bequest, to distribute assets, including cash,
having an aggregate fair market value at the date, or dates, of distri-
bution amounting to no less than the amount of that bequest, as
finally determined for federal estate tax purposes, or (2) a clause
requiring the executor to distribute assets, including cash, fairly
representative of appreciation or depreciation in the value of all
property thus available for distribution in satisfaction of the marital
bequest. Consideration should also be given to the use of a frac-
tional share formula which complies with the provisions of section
4.02 of Rev. Proc. 64-19. This formula has not received the at-
tention shown the pecuniary interest formula because of the com-
plexity of its administration. It was thought to require a fraction
of each asset to be distributed to each beneficiary.-"
It is suggested that whichever path is employed to escape its
thrust, Rev. Proc. 64-19 may achieve a beneficial result by inspiring
reviews of wills and testamentary plans, reviews which are often
long overdue.
THOMAS E. CAPPS
Torts-Hospital's Liability-Standard of Care
In Darling v. Charlestown Community Memorial Hosp., ac-
tion was brought by a patient to recover damages for personal
injuries allegedly caused by the hospital's negligence. The court
held that, even though there was no deviation from the local
standard of care, the hospital was negligent for failing to adhere
to its own regulations which required that it provide qualified
physicians. The questions presented by the decision are whether
a court should allow hospital rules in as evidence of a higher stan-
dard of care and, if it does, would such rules impose an undue
burden on a layman administrator in requiring him to ensure that
" CASNER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 798.
1 200 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. Ct. App. 1964).
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